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Uganda has many small producers that can benefit from the expanding sunflower production. 
Collecting scattered produce in remote areas is expensive. For efficient transport and processing, 
these small quantities have to be bulked in one place. In Uganda, three types of bulking 
arrangements exist: trader,led, processor,led and farmer,led. In each type, targeted investment 
policies and innovative financial institutions can increase the performance of the arrangements. 
Combining support for storage infrastructure with increased access to trade finance and 
strengthened governance structures will provide the room for upscaling thereby linking large 
numbers of poor households to growing markets. These interventions need target to groups that 
managed to build a minimum capacity in resolving problems around collective action and 
opportunistic behaviour. Previous experience with saving and credit schemes prove to form the 
basis for most of the successful bulking groups. 
2 Introduction 
The sunflower sector is a rapidly growing agricultural sector in Uganda. Most of the sunflower is 
produced by smallholders that live in the former war zone in the north. Oilseeds have become a 
prime cash crop and is instrumental for poverty reduction. It is estimated that 145,000ha are 
planted annually.ii There are ample growth possibilities for oilseed production in Uganda, as most 
of the vegetable oil is still made form imported palm oil. Sunflower producers are concentrated 
around the city of Lira. Smallholders in more remote areas can benefit from the growth potential 
when they have access to seeds and output markets.  
 
To maximise the opportunities for a remunerative inclusion, these new entrants must be attractive 
enough for traders and processors to source their products. Only sporadically, individual farmers 
sell directly to the processor. Sourcing from places and persons that have accumulated oilseeds 
under some sort of bulking arrangement is required, as a steady flow of oil seed is needed for 
processors to use their plants cost,efficiently.  
 
In bulking arrangements, several transactions take place. All transactions imply a negotiation 
between buyer and seller on the terms of trade. Disagreements about measures, quality and price 
at the moment of exchanging goods are possible in each of these transactions. To avoid or 
resolve disagreement and conflict, a bulking arrangement needs a governance structure.iii Trust is 
necessary for cost,efficient trade.  
 
In this research we explored the logistic functions and trust building mechanisms that characterise 
the different oilseeds bulking arrangements in Uganda.iv  
 
How are the bulking arrangements organised, and what are entrance points for support policies 
enabling the upscaling of these arrangements? 
 
First, we describe the three typical bulking arrangements that exist in the Uganda sunflower 
sector and indicate the key functions and trust building mechanisms that sustain their operation. 
Second, we indicate the key bottle,necks that constrain upscaling and possible entrance points to 
resolve them. In the conclusion, we stress the importance of considering bulking nodes as form of 
social capital in the value chain and as leverage point for public policy. 
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3 The national oilseed subsector platform OSSUP 
Since 2005, the Ugandan oilseed sector established a coordination platform, called OSSUP 
(OilSeed Subsector Platform) with representatives of oil processing companies, farmers 
organisations, research institutes, government programmes, financial institutions and 
development organisations. OSSUP headed an action,research pilot in the DGIS,Wageningen UR 
'Value Chain Development for Pro,Poor Development', financed by DGIS and executed by 
Wageningen UR.  
 
Between the different companies and farmer organisations in OSSUP there existed important 
differences in opinion on what would be the most effective policy to increase the efficiency and 
equity in the oil seed value chain. We wanted to add to a common strategy towards government 
and donors by conducting action,research. To do so, the research highlighted the common 
elements of these apparently different bulking arrangements, especially their need to balance the 
logistic activities of bulking with trust and compliance between transacting partners. The research 
was a major input for the discussion on bulking and financial services during the OSSUP strategic 
conference 10 September 2009 in Kampala, financed by SCAPEMA. Results have been 
incorporated in the action plan for a new phase of the IFAD,supported Vegetable Oil Development 
Project. 
4 Bulking arrangements in oilseeds 
There is a range of different bulking arrangements in the Uganda oilseed sector. Traditionally, 
farm products are collected and bulked by fellow farmers and middle,men in the village. There are 
also alternative bulking arrangements, both as farmer,led initiatives of collective marketing, and as 
part of processor,led arrangements, like contract farming. We will describe these three types of 
arrangements and focus on their need for logistic infrastructure, working capital and effective 
governance and trust. 
4.1 Traderled bulking arrangements 
 
Bulking and storage infrastructure 
Typically, within rural societies, the key agent that realises bulking of scattered produce from 
individual smallholders is the village,based farmer,trader who works as an agent for an urban 
based merchant or processor. Often the chain is rather long with many sub,agents. The logistics 
of storage is individual responsibility of each person in this chain of intermediation. The village,
based agent uses his house, often in the village trading centre, to store. Some village,based 
traders hire an additional place when bulking volumes that exceed the physical capacity of their 
house. Generally they manage to hire within the same trading centre from fellow middle,men. The 
traders interviewed in Lira use to hire a store on the Grain Street and use it for the products they 
want to sell immediately.  
 
Trust in the trader,agent network 
The trader's biggest asset is the network of agents he or she can mobilise in the villages. Some 
agents are travelling agents who visit a certain area, other agents are based in the trading centre. 
In these arrangement, the trader or processor provides working capital and a market outlets to 
the agents. This commercial relation between traders and agents is secured by a set of 
mechanisms and rules to control for opportunistic default, like compromising collaboration in the 
future or by affecting the credibility/reputation towards others traders and processors. Most of 
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these governance structures are based on informal rules and regulations, using legal course only 
as a threat not as a real mechanisms for dispute resolution.v  
 
'I sell to the loaders and buy through agents […]. You have two types of agents. Some of my 
agents go on their bicycle to the villages. They visit the villages three or four days a week. I 
advance money to improve their business. They pay back in the evening […]. But, most of my 
agents are farmers living in the trading centres and own the sub,stores […]. I do not use 
signed contracts with them. Often we only call by telephone. Transport takes some 50 Sh/kg 
and we give him something extra […]. If a sub,agent diverts money, the local authorities are 
called in and try to solve it. If the problem remains unsolved the police can come in [...]. You 
are dealing with trust.' 
(Trader 1, Grain Street Lira, interviewed in April 2008)  
 
Advancing work capital 
Traders may lend part of their capital from banks or other traders. As turnover in trade is high, 
money borrowed for one month that circulates several times a week can generate good profit 
with a modest margin per kilo. The high interest rates for commercial lending are not the major 
problem for traders; the issue of collaterals is mentioned more often, and seems particularly 
manifest when the traders work with several banks at the same time.  
 
'I work with the bank at 22%. Not bad. Even though I need to pay some extras for processing 
the request and to give to the loan officer. To get the loan you always have to give him 
something […]. As guarantee the bank accepts a land title, your house or a 'lease offer', e.g. 
renting your motorcycle.' 
(Trader 3, Grain Street Lira, interviewed April 2008)  
 
Agents set farm,gate price 
Traders use a reference price and leave a margin to their agents. The agent is free in lowering the 
price to the farmer when procuring the grains. The bargaining power of the agent is strong, 
especially in more remote areas. Markets for oilseed in the cities are open and competitive, and 
therefore markets near the cities tend to reflect price fluctuations in the market. In remote areas 
where transport is monopolised the choice for market outlets by the producing farmers is more 
limited and the bargaining power of the agent higher. Prices in these remote markets tend to be 
lower and less responsive to price fluctuation in destination markets.  
 
4.2 Processorled bulking arrangements 
 
Embedded services to farmers 
Increasingly, processors try to get replace traders or agents when procuring oilseeds. In some 
areas, bulking is realised through contractual arrangements between supplying farmers and 
procurement agents in which the farmer promises to sell his product in exchange for some 
services provided by the buyer. The scope of the services to be provided to the farmer can vary a 
lot. It can be based on advancing money, resolving the cash constraints of farmers during the 
planting season, or the provision of technical assistance to production.  
 
Coping with opportunistic behaviour 
In oil,seeds the availability of quality seed is key constraint. Therefore, most contract relations 
include seed provisioning as their prime service, be it on credit or paid cash at the start of the 
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growing season. But the provisioning of this service is expensive and risky. Contract farming will 
have to respond to two fundamental challenges related with opportunistic behaviour: how to get 
compliance to the agreements by the farmers (considering opportunistic behaviour of farmers); 
and, how can we safeguard our investment in the scheme (coping with free,riding by competing 
buyers).  
 
Corporate contract farming scheme 
The most important processor,led arrangement, involving 40,000 smallholders, was established 
by the Uganda oil processing industry Mukwano Industries Ltd. The company, with support of 
USAID,APEP, managed to establish a contract scheme with impressive growth in sunflower seeds 
procured from 2005 onwards. Bulking is done by a site,coordinator who works exclusively for the 
company and provides the embedded services to the farmer. According to a study by UPTOP,EU 
(2007)vi, around half of the farmers working with Mukwano indicated that they participate in some 
farmer groups, against only 10% of the non,contracted sunflower producers. (The site,
coordinators have competitive advantage above the traditional agents because they benefit from 
the easy flow of work capital that the company can invest in the transactions in the bulking 
arrangement.  
 
'I pay them cash on delivery using the advance payments given by the company. When the 
store is full, we contact the procurement officer responsible and the truck is sent to pick the 
grain from the store. I get a commission of 20 Ushs/kg of grain purchased from farmers as 
payment for working with the company' 
(Site Coordinator in Bukolo, interviewed in October 2008) 
 
4.3 Contract conditions and dispute resolution 
The Mukwano contract is signed by the farmer and Mukwano and is witnesses by the chairman of 
the parish, the so,called 'L.C. 1'. When arbitration is needed, the local administrative authority can 
be mobilised to enforce the contract. The contract is signed only once and is binding whenever 
the farmer receives seeds from Mukwano or until one of the parties communicates it 4 months in 
advance. The contract indicated the embedded services that obliges Mukwano, the minimum 
price paid in cash upon delivery and the mandatory quality parameters for the produce. Increases 
from the minimum price are possible. However, the contract did not estipulate the procedure to 
define the exact price at the moment of transaction. Like in most contract farming arrangements, 
the economic rentability of oilseed production is the responsibility of the farmer.  
 
Side,selling, or 'poaching' is mentioned by Mukwano as major problem in the contract scheme. 
Mukwano invests in the import of hybrid seeds from South Africa. The fact that the PAN 7351 
sunflower grains have a different appearance than the other varieties of sunflower in the area has 
facilitated Mukwano to effectively detect free,riding traders, and side,selling farmers. The 
Mukwano contract mentions the option of legal action to force compliance, and, indeed, police 
has been used in at least one occasion to control free,riding by competing traders.  
 
Mukwano was aware that the use of police and legal action to force compliance of the contract 
was not really a viable option and had adverse side,effects. Political pressure mobilised by the 
traders, smaller processors and farmers that were organised in UOSPA did speed up this 
process. From December 2007, Mukwano decided to distribute part of the PAN 7351 seeds by 
the input dealers (UNADA). Mukwano is still the dominant channel for the hybrids, but some 
traders have used the opportunity to buy and sell the seeds to gain a 'licence to buy'. Legal action 
 5
of the company against side,selling and free,riding is now even less viable than in the pre,2008 
season. From 2008 onwards Mukwano pays the prevailing market price when higher than the 
minimum price agreed upon. The contract farming scheme in strict sense with exclusive 
marketing of sunflower to the company has ceased to exist.  
 
Mukwano continues the structure of site,coordinators and entered in open competition with other 
agents or traders when sourcing oilseeds. Not the contract clauses but the efficiency in logistics 
and payments are key to defend its position as dominant buyer in the former contract scheme 
areas. Also, the ample access to working capital by the site coordinator gives this type of bulking 
arrangement a distinctive feature.  
4.4 Other processors' initiatives 
Also, several other processing companies, especially in the Lira area, do not rely on spot market 
transactions with traders on the Grain Street but are directly involved in setting up their own agent 
structure in rural areas. Embedded services are more limited than in the contract farming 
experience of Mukwano, as no exclusive sourcing rights are in place and free,riding on the 
investment by competing buyers is a major risk. However, the vertical coordination between the 
processor and the farmers is far greater than in the traditional agent,trader system. Nile Agro, 
Twin Brothers and Gurunanak are other big processors that started to invest in an agent network 
after installing or upscaling their processing capacity. They crushed cotton seeds during the 
1980s, but turned to sun flower after 2000 as cotton production in Uganda collapsed in the 
1990s. They adapted their processing plant to the specificities of sun flower and added additional 
machinery for refining the sun oil. They try to mobilize their former network of agents that worked 
in the depot centres several years ago. 
 
'We assemble agents in meeting; explain company expectations, in terms of quantity […]. 
Agents have verbal contracts. We advance money to them (between 0.5,2 million Ushs) and 
pay an commission between 20,30 Ushs/kg. When we worked in cotton we also paid a small 
salary as incentive for agents.' 
(Twin Brothers, interviewed in November 2008) 
 
 
4.5 Farmerled bulking arrangements 
 
Benefits to members 
Collective marketing by farmers is another way of resolving the bulking challenge. Farmers' 
organisations tend to look for ways to provide the village trader's bulking service to their 
members, substituting these intermediaries. Members will experience lower transaction costs, as 
their efforts to find a buyer and complete the market transactions are assumed by the group. 
However, there are obviously a range of costs associated with collective efforts to perform the 
same services as provided in the agent,trader bulking arrangement. A resulting net benefit will 
provide an important incentive for member loyalty to the collective marketing group. Without 
external support, this net benefit must be derived from efficiencies in economic transactions 




Coping with costs of collective action 
The group needs to generate its 'own income' to pay for the expenses made by active members 
or hired professional staff. Income from service provisioning to members is used to bear the cost 
associated with collective action. Additional benefits generated in the collective action are 
distributed to members, partly by increasing the price of agricultural produce sourced from them, 
partly by profit sharing and investments in (social) services to the members. Different economic 
services and mechanisms for income generation existed in the each collective bulking 
arrangements. 
 
Our case,studies highlight the importance of saving and credit schemes to generates both trust 
and income in the group. Income from these credit activities still complements the income from 
commissions applied on the products sold. The income from internal lending seems crucial and 
important in the initial stage of group formation to pay for the group's expenses. 
 
There are additional advantages in combining bulking with credit and savings activities. Long term 
credit for farmer groups is expensive, as it is only needed in part of the year. Therefore, internal 
lending of part of the working capital in times with little turnover is in itself a good way to generate 
income to pay part of these financial costs. However, it may reduce the amount of money 
available for advance payments to farmers and limit the volume that can be bulked by the group. 
Therefore, credit designs that induce pre,harvest cancellation, e.g with a reduction in interest 
payment or preferred access to critical harvest services, can induce members to cancel loans in 
kind at harvest time. Lending to members under condition of repayment with their harvest is a 
good way to reduce financial costs in bulking, increase trust building between members and 
group, while not affecting the scale of collective bulking 
 
'Through our loan scheme, members were able to access funds to buy improved varieties of 
seeds. This has led to increased yields and now we started to bulk and look for big buyers to 
purchase. Farmers wait for the produce to be sold before they receive payment. This has 
been facilitated by the loan scheme where farmers can borrow money awaiting sale of the 
produce.' 
(Obanga Ateuro Farmers Loan Association) 
 
Partial payments and trust in delegated marketing 
Another strategy to increase the scale of operation is to pay only a percentage of the price to the 
farmer at the moment of purchase and do a second payment only after the transactions with the 
trader or processor has been finished completely. This option is only feasible when the member 
have sufficient trust in the persons that do the transaction for them. For many incipient bulking 
arrangement this delegation of responsibilities in marketing is still problematic. Decisions on the 
sale of the product can be time,consuming when the group can decide in consensus,seeking 
meetings. Stronger groups have more agile procedures, with defined responsibilities and 
processes of accountability.  
  
'Both members and non,members bring their products, and some want to be paid cash and 
others can wait until products are sold. […] However, there is a difference between the price 
received by those who require cash and the price received by those who can wait.' 
(Busiu United Farmers Marketing Group) 
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5 Upscaling pathways 
To increase benefits of the stakeholders involved, all bulking arrangements need to increase the 
efficiency of the transactions in the chain. Efficiency gains can be realised by:  
- reducing the number of intermediating actors by increasing the bulking capacity of each 
intermediation segment; 
- eliminating some intermediation segments in the value chain by vertical integration by the 
processor and/or through collective marketing.  
 
The constraints for increasing throughput of the bulking arrangements differ between the three 
types of bulking arrangements. They can be summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 1 Upscaling pathways and key support policies 
Type Key constraint Upscaling path Support policies 
Trader,led Working capital Trade finance Warehouse 
Receipt Systems 
(WRS) 




Farmer,led Combination of 









5.1 Traderled upscaling 
 
Traders need ways to increase their collateral for loans 
As a result of chronic overcapacity in former cotton seed processing plants, coupled with a 
expanding and unsaturated market for domestic cooking oil, there is always a buyer for sunflower 
collected by traders. In the trader,led bulking arrangements, upscaling possibilities lie in the 
increase of the throughput per agent/trader involved. The capacity to bulk by each agents is 
constrained primarily by shortage of working capital and only marginally by constraints in 
logistics, like storage capacity or transport. Upscaling possibilities in these chains are, therefore, 
crucially dependent on the availability of trade finance. Processors and traders have access to 
banks, and interest rates are bearable for them as a result of the fast turnover, but there are 
constraints in their capacities to provide sufficient collateral to increase their borrowing.  
 
The promises of the Ware Receipt System 
A venue for upscaling lies in the development of financial instruments to use the stored oilseed 
grains as a collateral. The warehouse receipt system (WRS) is designed with that concept in mind. 
It is designed for farmer groups that want to store grains after harvest to wait for an improved 
price. The pilot experiences with WRS indicate the need to find 'satellite systems' that link smaller 
bulking arrangements and smaller storage facilities with the big warehouses that have been 
authorised and accepted by the banks under the WRS scheme. The working capital provided by 
the banks through these WRS systems would complement their capital to source more volume 
through their agent networks. 
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5.2 Processorled upscaling 
 
Processors need to offer attractive embedded services 
In the processor,led bulking arrangements the issue of working capital is less constraining, as the 
contracting companies use to have sufficient collateral for bank loans. The constraints for 
upscaling are especially related with the costs of investment in service provisioning and the 
difficulties to avoid free,riding of competing buyers. Low investments that create high farmer 
loyalty are critical to increase the stability of the sourcing relationship. Provisioning of post,harvest 
infrastructure to farmers can be an attractive service as an embedded service of the contractor. 
Limiting the time the farmer has to store the grains in his house, will limit the chance of side,
selling to others. Movable storage equipment, like metal silos can be subject to such lease 
agreements, just like transport vehicles or drying equipment. In leasing, the investment in movable 
equipment is financed by the bank with the physical integrity of the equipment as collateral. The 
processor only pays for the equipment in one payment when stolen, but if properly used, he pays 
a fixed amount during the economic life span of the equipment.  
 
Linking up with existing farmer groups? 
Likewise, the farmer groups in the villages can be used as an entrance point for establishing a 
more stable trade relation. Many farmer groups exist, but only some of them are bulking. Many 
successful collective marketing experiences visited in the field research proved to be based on a 
previous experience with non,commercial service delivery, like extension groups, religious groups, 
etcetera. Partnerships between the organisations that support these groups (churches, NGOs, 
local government) can establish the channels for contract relations to be established. Trust 
between members of this 'contract partnership' is essential to make it prosper.vii 
 
5.3 Farmerled upscaling 
 
Farmer groups need to upscale their bulking infrastructure and governance structure 
Most collective bulking arrangements analysed suffer from constraints on working capital, and 
many lack governance mechanisms that delegate commercial and administrative functions within 
a group. Both issues will have to be addressed to facilitate this 'big leap' forward of the farmer,led 
bulking arrangements. Previous experiences with credit and savings systems and the collective 
handling of storage or production facilities prove to be key mechanisms for building the trust and 
management capacity in the largest bulking groups. Cluster development, with strong core 
groups that facilitates the affiliation of weaker groups in federation,like farmers associations, is 
the most promising upscaling pathway. In this model, support in storage infrastructure and 
working capital for trade can be directed to already existing groups that have managed to build 
internal capacity in resolving problems around collective action and opportunistic behaviour, and 
in delegating functions and responsibilities within the organisation. 
 
New financial product are needed to provide the working capital 
Current possibilities for access to working capital constrain this cluster development pathway, as 
transaction costs for both the banks and the bulking groups are high and collateral is a major 
problem. No bulking arrangements interviewed was linked to the Warehouse Receipt System, and 
their volume of trade will make it unlikely that they can link with the WRS in the nearby future. Even 
the storage facilities of the cluster groups are too small to make it feasible to certify them as 
such. Additional investments are needed to meet the minimum requirements related to quality 
control of the products deposited. The linkage of WRS with these bulking sites will have to go 
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through the development of satellite systems that link these stores with the certified WRS stores 
in the cities, be it through higher tier collective marketing federations, or through a partnership 
with processors or big traders. Some experiences exist already that link farmers organisations to 
the WRS.  
 
Guarantee funds are needed to establish innovative credit lines 
Meanwhile, other, innovative enabling policies are needed to facilitate financial service 
provisioning to farmer groups. A promising venue to increase the access to working capital in 
bulking exists when it can be derived from a credit line that generates only limited financial costs 
when credit is not withdrawn. Guarantee funds, like the ones applied by DANIDA in the ASPS 
programme, will be necessary to induce commercial banks to open such credit lines for farmer 




Each type has a specific upscaling pathway 
All bulking arrangements analysed in this research have constraints that limit growth, both in 
volume and in number of farmers included in the arrangements. These constraints are specifically 
related with the capacity to generate trust in transactions with supplying farmers and buyers, 
more upstream in the chain. Upscaling is possible, especially when enabling policies are targeted 
to the key upscaling pathways in each type of arrangement.  
Processors will need to develop cost,effective embedded services to establish more stable 
relations with bulking agents and farmer groups, that limit their incentives for side,selling.  
Traders need to find forms to increase efficiency and turnover of their agent network by 
increasing access to trade finance.  
Farmer groups need to generate income and trust in order to upscale their bulking activities.  
 
Social capital is a critical resource for upscaling 
The research discovered the crucial importance of social capital formation, as a complementary 
resource to physical facilities such as storage facilities and value chain finance. It also points to 
the importance of credit and saving schemes in fostering this basic condition for the proper 
functioning of the collective bulking efforts. 
7 Recommendations 
 
Enable groups with bulking capacities 
Bulking  arrangements and warehouses are key entry points for development interventions that 
want to increase the throughput, quality and fairness in oilseed value chain, and add to the 
objective of smallholder inclusion and poverty alleviation. Enabling policies will have to addresses 
logistic challenges to ensure a reliable and consistent supply of produce volumes from scattered 
and unorganized farmers.  
 
Coordinate support  
For bulking groups, access to subsidies for infrastructural investments is handled by one set of 
support institutions, access to value chain finance handled by another (like banks and 
microfinance institutions) and management and leadership training (though more rare) is often 
supported by yet another group. For upscaling pathways to be effective, support has to be better 
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coordinated. The three elements are all needed in combination. When support to these three 
dimensions is offered in a more comprehensive way, it can generate the synergy that is currently 
missing. 
 
Make use of bulking for broader chain development interventions 
Once bulking nodes and warehouse systems are functional, they offer the opportunity to be 
aligned with other types of chain development interventions, such as advice on quality standards 
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